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Abstract 27 
 28 
We discuss the historical context for explorations of  “pristine inner experience,” attempts to 29 
apprehend and describe the inner experiences that directly present themselves in natural 30 
environments. There is no generally accepted method for determining whether such 31 
apprehensions/descriptions should be considered high fidelity.  By analogy from musical 32 
recording, we present and discuss one strategy for establishing experiential fidelity: the 33 
examining of brain activation associated with a variety of experiential perspectives that had not 34 
been specified at the time of data collection. We beeped participants in an fMRI scanner at 35 
randomly-determined times and recorded time-locked brain activations.  We used Descriptive 36 
Experience Sampling (DES) to apprehend and describe the participant’s experience that was 37 
ongoing at each beep.  These apprehensions/descriptions were obtained with no specific 38 
theoretical perspective or experimental intention when originally collected.  If these 39 
apprehensions/descriptions were of high fidelity, then these pairings of moments of experience 40 
and brain activations should be able to be productively examined and re-examined in multiple 41 
ways and from multiple theoretical perspectives.  We discuss a small set of such re-examinations 42 
and conclude that this strategy is worthy of further examination. 43 
 44 
Keywords: descriptive experience sampling (DES), fMRI, pristine inner experience, fidelity, 45 
introspection 46 
  47 
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Introduction 48 
 49 
 A main theme (if not the main theme) of the (roughly 135 year) history of psychology is 50 
what science should do about first-person reports of experience.  The first third (roughly 1879-51 
1925) of psychology’s history was marked by Introspection (spelled, as is usual for that period, 52 
with a capital I to call attention to the systematic methodological characteristics of the 53 
investigations conducted by Wundt, Titchener, Külpe, and others), as psychology attempted to 54 
study directly the elements of consciousness.  However, as is well known, the several 55 
Introspection laboratories failed to agree on fundamentally important issues such as whether 56 
imageless thought existed (Lieberman, 1979).  That disagreement left the Introspectionists 57 
vulnerable to vitriolic attack from all sides: psychoanalysts held that important processes were 58 
unconscious and therefore by definition non-introspectionable; behaviorists held that neither 59 
conscious nor unconscious contents were publicly observable and therefore should be excluded 60 
from science; the rising interest in individual differences undermined the Introspectionists’ 61 
search for universal mental elements.  For those and other historical or systemic reasons 62 
(Danziger, 1980), by about 1925 Introspection as psychological method had gone down in 63 
flames. 64 
Psychological history’s second third (1925-1970) was marked by the suppression of 65 
introspection. The behaviorists, broadly speaking, had gained control of psychological science.  66 
Introspection was so thoroughly discredited that the term was never even mentioned in 67 
psychological-method textbooks in this period except as the target of a historical condemnation 68 
(Hurlburt, Heavey, & Seibert, 2006). Explorations of private experience largely disappeared 69 
from psychological science and mention of the word “consciousness” became rare.  However, it 70 
gradually seemed to become apparent that private experiences (thoughts, feelings, etc.) were 71 
fundamentally important features of the human condition and that their radical exclusion by 72 
psychological science was too extreme. 73 
As the behaviorists lost their dominating grip, psychological history’s third third (1970-74 
present) saw a resurgence in psychological investigations of the human aspects such as thinking, 75 
feeling, self-concept, and so on, that had been excluded during behaviorism’s suppression.  76 
Psychology became “cognitive,” interested in mind, mental contents, and mental processes (with 77 
textbook titles like Cognitive Psychology: Connecting Mind, Research and Everyday Experience 78 
(Goldstein, 2014) and Cognition: Exploring the Science of the Mind (Reisberg, 2015).  79 
Psychological investigations were often performed using casual and untrained introspection (now 80 
written with a lower-case i to contrast it with the formal Introspection of the first third of 81 
psychology, and often called “self-report”) that presumed that people had straightforward access 82 
to their mental processes.  However, these new introspections were soundly criticized, for 83 
example, by Nisbett and Wilson (1977), who concluded in a widely cited review that  84 
 85 
the accuracy of subjective reports is so poor as to suggest that any introspective access 86 
that may exist is not sufficient to produce generally correct or reliable reports.  (Nisbett & 87 
Wilson, 1977, p. 233)   88 
 89 
The behaviorists continued their criticism.  Skinner, for example, criticized mentalistic 90 
explanations of behavior: 91 
 92 
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I see no evidence of an inner world of mental life relative either to an analysis of 93 
behavior as a function of environmental forces or to the physiology of the nervous 94 
system. … The appeal to cognitive states and processes is a diversion which could well 95 
be responsible for much of our failure to solve our problems.  (Skinner, 1977, p. 10) 96 
 97 
Modern psychology has not resolved these criticisms, resulting in a deep ambivalence 98 
about whether first-person reports should be admitted as psychological data (Woofitt & Holt, 99 
2011). Hurlburt and Heavey (2001) called it a chasm.  On the one side are those who, following 100 
the behaviorists, hold that introspection is impossible—that first-person reports of inner 101 
experience cannot be trusted and should continue to be excluded from scientific consideration.  102 
Instead of asking people to describe directly their mental processes, these investigators infer 103 
mental characteristics based on the observation of non-introspective measures such as reaction 104 
time, eye movements, and brain activity.   105 
On the other side of the chasm are those who hold, Skinner and Nisbett/Wilson 106 
notwithstanding, that introspection is necessary, that first-person accounts reveal important 107 
characteristics of people (and are even essential in understanding psychopathology), and that 108 
first-person accounts are scientifically acceptable within science.  These psychologists aim 109 
directly at inner experience, typically asking participants to fill out questionnaires that enquire, 110 
for example, about: their experiences while having undergone a resting state acquisition in a 111 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner; the frequency of their rumination;  the frequency of 112 
their obsessive thoughts;  their ability to maintain self-worth; the characteristics of their inner 113 
speech, of their nonjudgmental mindfulness, or of their attitude toward political involvement; or 114 
any of thousands of other supposedly experiential features.  These questionnaire reports are 115 
validated in a variety of ways (e.g., by correlating with existing questionnaires), often under the 116 
(usually unstated) belief that establishing validity implies that the observations themselves are of 117 
adequate fidelity.   118 
Hurlburt and Heavey (2001) held that both sides of the chasm deserve implementation.  119 
As the behaviorally inclined suggest, modern psychology should profit from the painful lessons 120 
of Introspection’s calamitous demise, as re-articulated by Skinner and by Nisbett and Wilson: 121 
there is indeed good reason to distrust self-reports (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015).  At the same time, 122 
however, inner experience is indeed a defining aspect of the human condition, and psychological 123 
science must use first-person reports of inner experience—inner experience cannot be adequately 124 
inferred from external measurements like reaction time.  On that view, psychological science 125 
should wrestle to the ground the question: under what conditions should first-person reports be 126 
held to be high fidelity accounts of inner experience?  However, rather than address the question, 127 
the two sides of the chasm have gone their separate ways. Many cognitive psychologists 128 
continue to downplay first-person reports, whereas others continue to rely on first-person 129 
questionnaires with little regard for the critiques from the other side. 130 
 131 
Descriptive Experience Sampling 132 
 133 
This historical sketch, like any thousand-word sketch of a 135-year period, is an 134 
oversimplification, and one could quibble about the dates and so on.  However, it sets the context 135 
for the explorations of “pristine inner experience” (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006) undertaken by 136 
Hurlburt and his colleagues, who have sought to honor both sides of the first-person-report 137 
chasm by suggesting that pristine experiences, the ongoing naturally occurring thoughts, 138 
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feelings, sensations, and so on that appear directly “before the footlights of consciousness” (as 139 
William James, 1890/1962, p. 153 would say), are characteristically human experiences that 140 
deserve to be considered by psychological science.  Hurlburt and his colleagues have advanced a 141 
method, Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES; Hurlburt, 2011; Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006; 142 
Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006), which is an attempt at a procedure that apprehends and describes 143 
pristine inner experience in high fidelity.  DES uses a random beeper to signal participants to 144 
attend to their ongoing experience at the moment of the beep, and coaches them in so doing 145 
using an iterative procedure (Hurlburt, 2009; 2011). They have argued that DES’s exploration of 146 
pristine inner experience avoids the pitfalls that led to Introspection’s demise by focusing on 147 
experience itself rather than searching for elements that underlie experience (Monson & 148 
Hurlburt, 1993).  Furthermore, DES avoids the traps of mentalism and language limitations 149 
described by Skinner (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001).  And furthermore, Hurlburt and Heavey (2001) 150 
note that Nisbett and Wilson specifically exempted DES-type investigations from their 151 
condemnation of introspection:  152 
 153 
We also wish to acknowledge that the studies do not suffice to show that people could 154 
never be accurate about the processes involved. To do so would require… theoretically 155 
interesting procedures such as interrupting a process at the very moment it was occurring, 156 
alerting subjects to pay careful attention to their cognitive processes, coaching them in 157 
introspective procedures, and so on.  (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, p. 246) 158 
 159 
(Further discussion of Nisbett and Wilson’s critique and psychology’s over-generalization of it is 160 
in Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2007, and in Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001.) 161 
Hurlburt (2011, chapter 17) claimed that pristine inner experience is radically 162 
nonsubjective—that is, it is not the result of opinion or impression but instead is 163 
directlyapprehendable, as Skinner and the behaviorists required—and has defended the adequacy 164 
of DES against skeptics, as in Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel (2007) and in Caracciolo and Hurlburt 165 
(in press). If such claims and defenses are at least partially correct, then science may have a way 166 
forward that escapes the experiential chasm.  Science, however, has yet to determine a way to 167 
evaluate such claims; this paper is intended as a contribution.  168 
   169 
Pristine experience 170 
 171 
As defined by Hurlburt (2011, Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006), pristine inner experiences are 172 
phenomena (including thoughts, feelings, sensations, 171 perceptions, etc.) that directly present 173 
themselves as we navigate our way through our natural environments.  We spend our waking 174 
lives immersed in our own experiences, so it might seem that we have privileged or infallible 175 
access to our own pristine experience, but Hurlburt (2011) argued that people are generally 176 
mistaken, and often grossly mistaken, about the characteristics of their own pristine experience.  177 
For example, Baars held that inner speech is ubiquitous (e.g., “Human beings talk to themselves 178 
every moment of the waking day”; Baars, 2003, p. 106), whereas DES investigations suggest that 179 
many people talk to themselves never or almost never (Hurlburt, Heavey, & Kelsey, 2013; 180 
Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015; cf. Alderson-Day & Fernyhough, 2015).  181 
Let us consider a few samples of pristine experience from “Susan,” a participant in the 182 
resting-state functional MRI (fMRI) study by Hurlburt, Alderson-Day, Fernyhough, and Kühn 183 
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(2015).  For now, let’s assume that this is a high-fidelity description of Susan’s pristine 184 
experience—we will return to the assumption of high-fidelity below. 185 
 186 
1:52:12 pm (sample 5.1): [Susan is lying quietly in the MRI scanner while a resting state 187 
acquisition is being made.] At the moment of the beep she is visualizing very strongly a 188 
scene from yesterday: she clearly innerly sees her boyfriend and his mother on a hillside 189 
next to the lake [much like she had actually seen them yesterday].  She sees the boyfriend 190 
in the shade, his mother in the sun, and (blurrily) a sea of people around them.  [Before 191 
the beep she had been thinking that they look like monkeys, the way monkeys perch in 192 
family groups.]  Simultaneously she is somehow saying to herself in her own voice 193 
something like “they do look like monkeys.”  These are words floating around but they 194 
don’t make a full sentence.  This is something like implied words rather than actually 195 
experienced words. 196 
 197 
Pristine experience refers to a phenomenon that at a particular moment appears directly 198 
“before the footlights of consciousness.”  At the moment of this beep, Susan’s pristine 199 
experience includes (a) innerly seeing her boyfriend and his mother and (b) the inner 200 
incompletely worded saying of something like “they do look like monkeys.”  Pristine experience 201 
does not include anything that is not directly experienced.  It therefore does not include aspects 202 
of the current context (e.g., that Susan was lying in the scanner at the Max Planck Institute in 203 
Berlin or the sensation of the scanner stretcher against her back) unless those aspects are directly 204 
apprehended; it also does not include historical facts (e.g., that yesterday Susan was at the lake) 205 
unless somehow that fact is at the moment directly apprehended; nor does it include impressions 206 
(e.g., that mother and son are co-dependent) unless somehow that impression is at the moment 207 
directly apprehended. Pristine experience does not include putative causation (e.g., that Susan 208 
innerly sees them because she thinks they are co-dependent) unless that causation is at the 209 
moment directly apprehended; and it does not include putative personality characteristics (e.g., 210 
that Susan is an introvert).  DES calls that nearly infinite list of potential experiences the 211 
“welter” (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).  That is, out of all the things that could conceivably have 212 
become part of Susan’s experience at 1:52:12 (out of the welter of potentialities), Susan did—for 213 
whatever reason—experience the inner seeing of the boyfriend, mother, and hillside and the 214 
inner speaking of the incompletely worded “they do look like monkeys.” 215 
Distinguishing between pristine experience and all else is of fundamental importance to 216 
the science of experience because pristine experience (but not those alternatives) is radically 217 
non-subjective (Hurlburt, 2011, ch. 17).  Susan’s pristine experience was private (available only 218 
to her), to be sure, and cannot be directly verified by an external observer (who at 1:52:12 would 219 
see only that Susan was lying quietly in the scanner).  However, at 1:52:12, whether Susan was 220 
or was not innerly seeing her boyfriend and his mother is not a matter of subjective impression 221 
but of (Susan’s radically non-subjective) direct apprehension.  By contrast, an impression of 222 
mother-son co-dependence (an example from the welter of non-pristine alternatives) is not 223 
directly apprehended at any given moment—co-dependence is not apprehended but inferred, and 224 
that inferential process might on other occasions lead to the mother’s overbearingness, or to the 225 
boyfriend’s weakness, or to any of a host of more-or-less related constructs.  That is, co-226 
dependence does not have the “either it was or was not” characteristic that pristine experience 227 
has. 228 
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And even if Susan’s co-dependence impression could be established, it would be difficult 229 
if not impossible to establish the extent to which Susan’s version of co-dependence is similar to 230 
that of others (see Skinner, 1974, and its discussion in Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001).  By contrast, 231 
we can interrogate Susan about what she means when she says she “sees” her boyfriend at 232 
1:52:12.  In what ways is this “seeing” similar to or different from seeing the pencil there on the 233 
table? In what ways is this “seeing” similar to or different from hearing Elton John’s “Candle in 234 
the Wind” playing through your earbuds?  In what ways is this “seeing” similar to or different 235 
from tasting the chocolate candy you are eating? With further questioning, it turns out that 236 
Susan’s inner seeing is experientially much more similar to external seeing than it is to external 237 
hearing or tasting.  That kind of refinement is not possible for the co-dependence impression (see 238 
Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001), or the causation inference, or many of the other potentialities in the 239 
welter. 240 
We can (and did) perform that kind of refinement in the interview about the inner 241 
speaking of “they do look like monkeys.”  We discovered that it was similar to speaking aloud in 242 
that it was in Susan’s own voice and so on. However, we discovered, with Susan, and 243 
surprisingly to Susan herself, that the words were not clearly defined.  We discovered that there 244 
were words involved in this experience (not merely the meanings that might be intended); 245 
somehow Susan was saying something like these words (that is, the experience was of speaking, 246 
not of seeing the words, not of merely knowing the words were present).  We discovered that this 247 
description of not-clearly-defined-words was not merely an artifact of Susan’s rhetorical style (or 248 
of our way of interviewing), because at other samples Susan’s descriptions of words were 249 
unambiguously detailed… 250 
 251 
2:14:29 pm (sample 5.3): Susan is looking at her eyes in the scanner mirror, noting the 252 
distance from her eyes to her eyebrows.  She is saying to herself, “Wish I looked like that 253 
standing,” in her own soft inner voice with a slightly ironic or humorous tone.  This is a 254 
completely worded sentence except that the subject “I” is implied rather than explicitly 255 
spoken; the words and their manner of presentation (slightly ironic or humorous tone) are 256 
unambiguously apprehended.  Simultaneously, Susan is beginning to attend to the 257 
symmetry of her eyes/eyebrows, but that is not (or perhaps not yet) a complete thought.  258 
 259 
2:19:02 pm (sample 5.4): [Susan had been wondering whether the pitch in which she 260 
speaks correlates with how she feels.]  At the moment of the beep she was innerly 261 
speaking, answering that question: “I think so,” but with the intonation of the word 262 
“think” expressing uncertainty.  263 
 264 
…whereas, at other samples, Susan’s thinking involved no words at all: 265 
 266 
11:08:44 am (sample 8.8) Susan is innerly seeing her best friend Angie slightly in profile 267 
(with Angie’s pony tail on the right and farther away).  Susan clearly sees Angie’s face 268 
and hair but not what she is wearing.  Susan knows that Angie is standing in front of a 269 
café or somewhere in her hometown, although the background is blurry. At the moment 270 
of the beep Susan is also thinking/wondering, wordlessly, something like Will we remain 271 
besties? while simultaneously feeling love for her and missing her. This feeling is a 272 
warmth transferring from Susan to Angie; this is a mental not physical warmth.  273 
 274 
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As a result, the DES method applied in Hurlburt, Alderson-Day, Fernyhough, and Kühn 275 
(2015) would conclude that Susan’s apprehensions of her pristine experiences include a range of 276 
completeness in the inner expression of words, ranging from quite completely expressed with 277 
explicitly apprehended prosody (5.3) to innerly speaking with implied words (5.1) to thinking 278 
without words at all (8.8).   279 
 280 
Establishing fidelity 281 
 282 
The method applied in Hurlburt, Alderson-Day, Fernyhough, and Kühn (2015) would 283 
further conclude that Susan’s range of completeness was a characteristic of her pristine inner 284 
experience, not merely an artifact of the data acquisition or interview process.  That is, Hurlburt, 285 
Alderson-Day, Fernyhough, and Kühn claimed that they had provided high fidelity descriptions 286 
of Susan’s (and their other participants’) pristine inner experiences.  Whether such a claim 287 
should be believed lies in the center of the chasm described above. If DES (or some other 288 
method) actually provides high fidelity apprehensions and descriptions of pristine inner 289 
experience, then there is a way out of the chasm: the behaviorally inclined can require 290 
apprehensions/descriptions whose fidelity is credible, and the experientially inclined can 291 
acknowledge that pristine inner experience gives a glimpse into the human condition. Currently, 292 
however, there is no well-developed scientific strategy to evaluate a claim about the fidelity of 293 
apprehensions/descriptions of private experience (Price & Barrell, 2012).  Many would claim 294 
that because inner experience is private, it and descriptions thereof cannot possibly be of high 295 
fidelity. We begin with a thought experiment. 296 
Suppose you are a deaf recording engineer, and you have before you a recording of a 297 
symphony, its score, and some sophisticated audio editing equipment.  You wish to know 298 
whether the recording is of high fidelity.  You decide to examine the recording from the 299 
perspective of oboes: the score tells you that oboes should be playing at measures 21, 57, 63…, 300 
and not playing at measures 14, 43, 67…  You know something about the timbre (that is, the 301 
wave form) of oboes; you use your equipment and discover that there is indeed something oboe-302 
like in measures 21, 57, 63, … and not in 14, 43, 67, ….  Then you decide to examine from the 303 
perspective of trumpets: the score tells you where there are trumpets, and your equipment shows 304 
trumpet wave forms at the specified measures. Eventually, if you do this from a large enough 305 
sample of instrumental perspectives and a large enough sample of measures, and make ever more 306 
close distinctions (as between oboe and English horn), and use ever more sophisticated 307 
equipment, because the original recording was made without particular regard for the particular 308 
perspectives that you have sampled, you will eventually conclude that the recording is of high 309 
fidelity even though you yourself cannot have any direct access to the fidelity of the recording 310 
itself.   311 
By analogy, if apprehensions/descriptions of pristine experience are indeed of high 312 
fidelity, it should be possible to examine them from a variety of perspectives not specifically 313 
intended in the original data gathering. If those not-specifically-intended examinations show 314 
expected characteristics, then we should take that as evidence that the original 315 
apprehensions/descriptions were of high fidelity.  (In passing, we note that it is the radically 316 
nonsubjective nature of pristine inner experience that makes this kind of multiple-perspective 317 
exploration possible.) To explore the putative fidelity of DES apprehensions/descriptions, we 318 
proceeded in two basic steps. 319 
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 First, time-locked to recordings of brain activation using fMRI, we used DES to 320 
apprehend and then describe ongoing experience in (putative) high fidelity—that is, we aspired 321 
to faithful apprehensions/descriptions of phenomena as they present themselves of themselves 322 
(Hurlburt, 2011), not skewed or distorted.  (Toward this end, the DES procedure and its 323 
expositional interviews are “open-beginninged” (Hurlburt, 2011; Hurlburt, Alderson-Day, 324 
Fernyhough, & Kühn, 2015); that is, the procedure does not specify in advance the feature(s) of 325 
inner experience to be investigated.  Open-beginninged-ness is a necessary feature of fidelity, by 326 
analogy to the audio recording—the recording does not try, a priori, to record the oboes in high 327 
fidelity, it tries to record the audio scene as it naturally occurs in high fidelity, which can later be 328 
listened to for any features of interest, including  oboes, trumpets, etc.).  The procedure is 329 
described in Hurlburt, Alderson-Day, Fernyhough, and Kühn (2015), Kühn, Fernyhough, 330 
Alderson-Day, and Hurlburt (2014), and Hurlburt, Alderson-Day, Kühn, and Fernyhough (2016), 331 
and sketched briefly here.  We trained participants in four days of DES sampling in the 332 
participant’s natural environment, each with its attendant one-hour expositional (“iterative”) 333 
interview, which involved multiple co-interviewers. Thereafter each participant underwent nine 334 
25-min fMRI scanner sessions, receiving four quasi-random DES beeps. Brain activations time-335 
locked to those beeps were recorded. In the usual DES procedure, the co-interviewers wrote and 336 
edited a “contemporaneous” description of each of the sampled experiences from that session. 337 
This resulted, for each participant, in 9 × 4 = 36 beeped attempts to apprehend in-scanner inner 338 
experience, 36 written descriptions thereof, and 36 time-locked fMRI brain activations.  There 339 
were five such participants, resulting in a total of 5 × 36 = 180 experiences/activations. 340 
The second part of our exploration of fidelity involves, by analogy from our deaf 341 
engineer, examining the apprehensions/descriptions (obtained in the first part) from a variety of 342 
perspectives not explicitly contemplated during data collection.  For example, if the interviews 343 
happen to describe inner speaking as being ongoing at beep 7, 16, 29, 31, 84, 93, and 142 but not 344 
at the remaining beeps, and the brain activations modeled on those particular inner-speaking 345 
beeps different from activations modeled on the remaining beeps in ways relevant to speech, we 346 
have one bit of evidence in favor of fidelity of apprehension/description. If the interviews happen 347 
to describe visual imagery as being ongoing at particular beeps but not at the remaining beeps, 348 
and the brain activations so modeled show characteristics relevant to vision, we have another bit 349 
of evidence for fidelity. 350 
Kühn, Fernyhough, Alderson-Day, and Hurlburt (2014) explored one such perspective by 351 
noting that the expositional interviews of one of their participants, “Lara,” indicated that eight 352 
out of 36 samples included inner speaking. fMRI analysis on this individual showed that the 353 
eight inner-speaking samples were indeed accompanied by increased activity in left inferior 354 
frontal gyrus (IFG), a main element of the speech network established by other fMRI studies.  355 
That result can be interpreted as a bit of evidence in favor of the credible fidelity of the 356 
apprehension/description of Lara’s pristine experience because, during the sampling procedure, 357 
we had not been especially interested in Lara’s inner speaking.  When the expositional 358 
interviews identified eight in-scanner moments that happened to involve inner speaking, we 359 
could make a risky prediction that brain activation relevant to speaking had been ongoing at 360 
those moments: a prediction that was subsequently confirmed.  Such evidence is not conclusive: 361 
it is possible, for example, that Lara had been speaking aloud at those moments but denied it in 362 
the interviews.  Replications are required to distinguish among such possibilities. 363 
Fidelity in general involves the potential for refinement of detail, and this study allowed 364 
such refinement with respect to inner speaking.  Lara’s experience, as putatively revealed in the 365 
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expositional interviews, included a continuum of the manner in which she apprehended inner 366 
words, ranging from innerly spoken to innerly heard.  Lara’s brain activity during those moments 367 
claimed to be of inner speaking, when contrasted to moments claimed to be innerly hearing her 368 
own voice, showed increased activity in left IFG.  This is another bit of evidence in favor of the 369 
credibility of the fidelity of the DES apprehensions/descriptions. 370 
Hurlburt, Alderson-Day, Kühn, and Fernyhough (2016) re-examined these data 371 
(including data of five participants) from a somewhat different perspective.  On the first day of 372 
participation in the study (and prior to any DES involvement, see the lower left corner of Figure 373 
1), participants had been placed in the scanner and asked to complete five typical in-scanner 374 
tasks such as: form a mental image of a pencil, imagine hearing a tinkling, feel anxiety, feel a 375 
shiver, and innerly say “elephant.”  Then DES training and sampling in the scanner was 376 
performed as described above.  Hurlburt et al. showed that of the 180 in-scanner samples across 377 
all participants, the expositional interviews identified 52 that involved spontaneous inner 378 
speaking. (Recall that this study was open-beginninged—we had not specifically targeted inner 379 
speaking.) The brain activation that had been recorded during those 52 moments could be 380 
compared to the brain activation that had been recorded from the same participants during the 381 
task-elicited inner speech (e.g., say “elephant”).  Whereas task-elicited inner speech was 382 
associated with decreased activation in Heschl’s gyrus (and also left IFG increase), spontaneous 383 
inner speech was associated with increased Heschl’s gyrus activation.  That was surprising 384 
because Heschl’s gyrus is a brain area usually understood to be involved in hearing.  Because 385 
activations in a targeted brain region differentiated between task-elicited and spontaneous inner 386 
speaking, this result can be interpreted as another bit of evidence in favor of the fidelity of 387 
apprehension/description of pristine (spontaneous) experience. 388 
  Recalling that fidelity involves the potential for refinement of detail, the putative fidelity 389 
of the descriptive procedure allowed the investigators to notice that some of those 52 moments of 390 
inner speaking also (simultaneously) involved prominent inner characteristics not related to 391 
speaking (visual imagery, for example), and other samples were of moments where the 392 
participant and/or the interviewers were not confident that inner speaking had been ongoing.  393 
Those samples could be removed from the analysis, resulting in 20 samples where the 394 
investigators were confident that inner speaking was the most prominent aspect. The fMRI 395 
analysis was repeated for those 20 samples, with results similar to the 52-moment results.  This is 396 
another bit of evidence in favor of the fidelity of apprehension/description of pristine experience. 397 
 In sum: if apprehensions/descriptions of inner experience are indeed of high fidelity, 398 
then it should be possible to “mine” those apprehensions/descriptions from a variety of 399 
perspectives not explicitly considered when the apprehensions/descriptions were created.  For 400 
one example, Smallwood and colleagues (2012; Smallwood, 2011) have proposed that the 401 
fluctuation between task-centered cognition and mind wandering involves switching between 402 
neural networks that process the externally imposed environmental task and different networks 403 
that process internally generated information.  If the Hurlburt, Alderson-Day, Kühn, and 404 
Fernyhough (2016) apprehensions/descriptions are of high fidelity, it should be possible to re-405 
examine their samples from an internal/external perspective and then determine whether the 406 
corresponding brain activations match Smallwood’s theoretical predictions. A similar process 407 
could be undertaken for any theory that claims a link between experience and brain activity.  408 
 409 
Discussion 410 
 411 
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We have made the case that apprehending and describing inner experience in high 412 
fidelity is important to science, and therefore that it will be necessary for science to figure out 413 
how to evaluate the credibility of claims about fidelity. We have discussed one potential avenue 414 
for evaluating such claims—examining fMRI data from multiple experiential perspectives not 415 
originally contemplated when the data were collected. We intend this discussion to be a small 416 
step in an important direction, more about raising potentialities than of establishing results, but 417 
we suggest there are enough bits of evidence to suggest that the fidelity of 418 
apprehensions/descriptions can be productively explored by examining and re-examining 419 
pairings of moments of experience and brain activations in multiple ways from multiple 420 
perspectives.   421 
The DES studies described here are expensive in terms of time, expertise, and equipment.  422 
It is reasonable to ask whether such studies are worth science’s effort.  It seems to us that 423 
fundamental principles are at stake. High fidelity apprehensions/descriptions of experience are 424 
necessary to examine claims that form the basis of consciousness science (such as that inner 425 
speech is ubiquitous), are important in advancing science’s understanding of brain function (such 426 
as that inner speaking and inner hearing have different neural signatures), and may be useful in 427 
refining constructs that have been suggested by other programmes of research (such as 428 
Smallwood’s internal/external theory). 429 
Hurlburt, Alderson-Day, Kühn, and Fernyhough (2016) suggest another implication of 430 
high-fidelity data collection.  The power of a statistical test is essentially the effect size times the 431 
sample size divided by the experimental error.  Most fMRI studies attain adequate power by 432 
using a large sample size to increase the numerator.  However, it may also be possible (as 433 
described above) to attain adequate power by selecting more experientially homogeneous 434 
samples to decrease the denominator experimental error.  It was the high fidelity data collection 435 
that made it possible to notice that of the 52 samples that included inner speaking, only 20 436 
involved inner speaking as the most salient characteristic.  It was then possible to use only those 437 
20 samples, thus making the experiences more homogeneous and thereby reducing the 438 
experimental error.  Such refinement would most likely not be possible without high fidelity 439 
apprehensions/descriptions. 440 
Many observers have suggested the desirability of versions of DES that involve less time 441 
and less expertise (e.g., Alderson-Day & Fernyhough, 2015; Froese, Gould, & Seth, 2011; 442 
McAuliffe & McGann, 2016).  Alternatively, it might be observed that fidelity considerations 443 
suggest the desirability that science spend more of its resources in cultivating methods that seek 444 
to provide high fidelity observations.  A mature science of experience would work through the 445 
situations in which each would be desirable.     446 
It is not our intention to contend that DES is the epistemic tribunal against which all 447 
methods of introspection should be judged (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel, 2011).  Other traditions 448 
have also shown the usefulness of combining disciplined first-person approaches with 449 
neuroscience, for example the neurophenomenology of Varela and colleagues, the visual 450 
perception studies of Lutz et al. (2002),  and the seizure anticipation experience of Petitmengin, 451 
Navarro, and Baulac (2006).  Our aim is to encourage discussion of first-person fidelity and the 452 
criteria for establishing it. 453 
  454 
 455 
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